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Identity and Personhood: Advocating for the
Abolishment of Closed Adoption Records Laws
JESSICA COLIN-GREENE
Adoptees are denied access to identifying information about their biological
heritage in myriad ways. Accessing adoption records, however, is critical to the
deeply personal identity formation processes of many adopted persons. This Note
urges the abolishment ofclosed adoption records laws by addressing social science
and constitutional arguments in support of unfettered access to adoptees who wish
to obtain identifying information about their natural origins. This Note highlights
the identity struggles faced by many adoptees who lack access to this information,
and suggests an expanded understanding of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to include the right ofdecisional autonomy in the context of
identity development as a liberty interest. This Note also argues that adolescent
adoptees should be permitted to obtain access to their adoption records through a
parental and/or judicial approval procedure, and briefly considers children's role
within the constitutional penumbras encompassing familial and other privacy
rights. Adoptees have distinct liberty and privacy interests in identity, personhood,
and decisional autonomy, and evidence strongly suggests that many adolescent and
adult adoptees could benefit profoundly from complete access to their adoption
records.
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Identity and Personhood: Advocating for the
Abolishment of Closed Adoption Records Laws
JESSICA COLIN-GREENE*
INTRODUCTION
Adoption is a sensitive topic. Adoptive parents, biological parents, and
adoptees alike face a convergence of shame, confusion, and stigma-related
issues, which make the adoption experience difficult to address. Shame
stems from many sources-infertility, embarrassing or "immoral"
circumstances, and early abandonment. Whatever the reasons for the
imposition of secrecy, lacking access to fundamental information about
one's biological origins can be an objectifying and dehumanizing experience
for innumerable adoptees. Recent movements have clarified the adoptee
experience and argued for unconditional disclosure of birth and adoption
records, but states have been slow to respond.
This Note argues for the total abolishment of closed adoption records
laws and any related impediment to adoptees' receipt of birth and adoption
record contents. In so doing, this Note explores the psychological, legal, and
constitutional dimensions of the adolescent and adult adoptee experience. In
Sections I and II, this Note explains past and current adoption record
disclosure law in the United States in order to fit the current adoption records
debate-and the thesis of this Note-in historical context. In Section III, this
Note briefly defines the interests of adoptive and biological parents. In
Section IV, this Note details the identity and personhood interests of the
adoptee, as well as federal claims brought by open records advocacy groups.
This Note also explores adoptees' constitutional liberty and privacy
interests. In light of these interests, this Note suggests that a more robust
understanding of decisional autonomy under the Due Process Clause should
include the right to personal identity construction without state interference.
This Note then discusses the dehumanizing effect of closed records laws by
exploring the notion of the adopted child as chattel. In Section V, this Note
investigates the experiences and challenges unique to adolescent adoptees
and suggests that some within this group would benefit from access to
information about personal and biological heritage.
. University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2018; University of Connecticut, summa
cum laude, B.A. in International Social Justice 2013. 1 would like to thank Professor Anne Dailey for her
guidance and my colleagues at the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful feedback and excellent
company. Special thanks and gratitude to my dear friends for their extraordinary support, and a very
heartfelt thank you to Robin Colin-Greene, Ira Greene, Soren Greene, and Jerry Schwab.
This Note asserts that access to information about an adoptee's
biological origins could curtail disruptive adolescent behaviors that
adversely affect an adoptee as he or she advances into adulthood. To this
end, this Note suggests a procedure whereby a minor-adoptee can, with
parental approval, gain access to their birth information. In the absence of
parental approval and/or consultation, this Note proposes that minor-
adoptees go directly to a court and make a showing that they bear the
requisite level of mental health and maturity to receive the information
sought. This Note concludes by emphasizing the importance of accessing
adoption records to the deeply personal identity formation processes of
adoptees. Finally, this Note highlights the compelling emotional,
psychological, and constitutional interests of adoptees, which necessitate the
abolishment of state laws that impede access to adoption records.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF ADOPTION RECORD DISCLOsuRE LAW
The apprenticeship system, which served as a model for early adoption
practices, was brought to the American colonies by Puritans.' In the
colonies, child labor was in great demand, and orphans were apprenticed, or
"bound out." 2 At the time, concern for child welfare was far eclipsed by
economic necessity.3 The term "adoption" did not come into use until the
mid-nineteenth century, and these "adoptions" were devoid of any binding
or legal provisions.' Although there were no standards of care for orphaned
children at this early stage, the colonies eventually made the shift to a
standard of care that regulated placement of children in order to protect the
child's best interests and welfare.' The shift was prompted when reformers
recognized that a great many children had been placed in uncaring, abusive,
and unwholesome homes.6
In following the trend toward a "best-interests" standard, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts passed what is generally considered to be
the first American adoption law in 185 1.' This early Massachusetts law
I ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE 30 (1984); Heidi Hildebrand, Because
They Want to Know: An Examination of the Legal Rights ofAdoptees and Their Parents, 24 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 515, 519 (2000).
2 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 30.
3 id.
Id. at 31. Sorosky does recognize, however, that a number of adoptions during this time period
were recognized by courts ifa particular family made arrangements to have a particular child become an
heir and such arrangements were made using acceptable legal documentation. Id.
' Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 519.
6 See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 31-32 ('The first legal regulations in the United States came
about because there was such widespread need to control the wholesale distribution of children to homes
where they were used as cheap labor.").
An Act to Provide for the Adoption of Children, Acts and Resolves Passed by the General Court
of Massachusetts, ch. 324 (1851); Wayne Deloney, Unsealing Adoption Records: The Right to Privacy
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emphasized child welfare, required written consent from both biological
parents before the severance of legal ties, and required judicial approval in
order for an adoption to be consummated.! Half of the states enacted similar
adoption laws in the succeeding quarter century.' The "best-interests"
standard-a trend that spanned a century, starting from its inception in the
mid-1800s-is considered to be one of the most significant American
contributions to the law of adoption."o
Under early adoption laws, adoption records were not sealed and were
open for public inspection." The trend shifted toward closure of adoption
records around the turn of the century, when a combination of legal and
scientific factors resulted in the cultural stigmatization of adoption.12 In
order to protect adopted children from the stigma associated with
illegitimacy and related prejudices, reformers convinced states to enact
further regulation.1 3 Many states soon enacted statutes requiring adoption
investigations and probationary periods.14
The earliest of these was a 1917 Minnesota law requiring that adoption
records be barred from inspection by anyone not a party in interest to the
adoption." In a further effort to reduce the stigma of illegitimacy, as well as
to improve state data collection of children's vital statistics, in the 1930s and
1940s states began issuing new birth certificates to adopted children that
included only the names of the child's adoptive parents.1 By 1948,
confidentiality laws had developed such that nearly every state issued new
birth certificates upon the issuance of an adoption decree, and with it a
fictional "rebirth."1 7 It is believed that an additional purpose of issuing new
birth certificates was to buttress the connection between the adoptee and his
or her adoptive family.'"
The initial purpose of sealing the original birth certificate and
subscribing to the legal fiction of the new one was to protect the adoptive
Versus the Right ofAdult Adoptees to Find Their Birthparents, 7 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC.
117, 119 (2007); Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 519.
An Act to provide for the Adoption of Children, supra note 7; Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 519.
Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 519.
10 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 32.
" Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 519-20.
12 See id at 520 (noting that adopted children had fewer inheritance rights than biological children,
that courts and legislatures favored biological over adoptive parents in custody disputes, and that the
scientific community propagated a theory linking unmarried mothers to feeblemindedness).
13 Id.
14 Id.
" Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening
Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 150, 155 (1999).
1d.; Deloney, supra note 7, at 120.
Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 520-21.
8 Jennifer R. Racine, Comment, A Fundamental Rights Debate: Should Wisconsin Allow Adult
Adoptees Unconditional Access to Adoption Records and Original Birth Certificates?, 2002 Wis. L. REV.
1435, 1441 (2002).
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family from intrusion by persons not involved in the adoption." In other
words, early statutes were not intended to keep information confidential
from the parties in interest to the adoption (the adoptee, adoptive parents,
biological parents, and their respective legal representatives), but from the
general public.20
A post-World War II change in adoption clientele may be responsible
for the shift from protecting parties in interest from outside intruders to
protecting the parties from each other.2 1 It has been surmised that pre-World
War II birth mothers were either married or divorced and simply could not
support the child financially; in contrast, post-war birth mothers produced
more children born out of wedlock.22 The unwed mothers sought protection
from cultural prejudices by opting for private adoptions where
administrators neither asked questions nor kept records, and operated under
a veil of secrecy and nondisclosure. 23  State-licensed agencies with
professional social workers began competing with the unlicensed private
administrators and secrecy became the custom. 24 At the same time,
professional social-work organizations began interpreting the "best interests
of the child" to mean a full separation between the natural parents and the
adoptee by sealing adoption records and proceedings, a general
recommendation that state statutes reflected.25 Secrecy also protected
adoptive couples from the shame of infertility at a time when producing
offspring was both a patriotic act and a symbol of marital success.26
In summation, a competition for business between licensed and
unlicensed adoption agencies, combined with social workers' post-war
interpretation of the "best-interests" standard,27 resulted in the regime of
secrecy and nondisclosure of proceedings and records that ultimately
prevailed up to the present. Sealed records became the "primary safeguard
for adoptive families" and for birth parents alike.28
19 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 38. Another reason for sealing the original birth certificate was
to protect the adoptive family from intrusion of the birth parents so that all parties might move on with
their lives, although this was not the original function of sealing records. Id
2o Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 521. By the 1930s, a few states prevented biological parents from
accessing records but, in most states, the parties in interest were exempt from confidentiality clauses. Id.
2 Id. at 522.
22 See id.; Calm & Singer, supra note 15, at 156.
23 See Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 522.
2
' Id.; Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 156.
25 Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 522; Racine, supra note 18, at 1441.
26 Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 157.27 See id. at 156 (noting that post-World War 1l social workers believed that secrecy would not only
protect the unity and integrity of the adoptive family, but would also help birth mothers to move on from
their indiscretion as if the child never existed, to get married, and to go on to lead "normal" lives).
28 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 38.
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II. CURRENT ADOPTION RECORD DISCLOSURE LAW ACROSS THE STATES
In the 1960s and 1970s, a change in cultural and societal perspectives
regarding sex, birth control, abortion, single parenthood, and gender roles
led to a decrease in the stigma associated with illegitimacy.29 While
empowered birth mothers seeking knowledge about their relinquished
children helped drive an increase in open adoptions," adult adoptees seeking
knowledge of their natural origins formed advocacy groups that challenged
sealed records laws.3 1 As a result of the pressure generated by these groups,
many states enacted statutes permitting access to restricted information
under certain conditions.3 2 A number of states granted unencumbered access
to nonidentifying information3 3 contained in the records and established a
variety of registry systems34 to facilitate the release of identifying
information.35
Adoption law varies from state to state. Most adoption statutes contain
29 Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 522-23; Racine, supra note 18, at 1441.
30 Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 523.
" Infra Section IV.B.
32 Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 523.
3 3Nonidentifying information is information that does not include the identities of the birth parents.
3 Nearly half of the states have some form of mutual consent registry system, whereby parties
directly in interest to the adoption can indicate their willingness to exchange identifying information.
Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 162. Both a biological relative and an adult adoptee must have registered
in the affirmative in order for identifying information to be released. Id. at 163. In some states, both
biological parents must register in the affirmative, while in other states only one biological parent's
consent is required. Id Some states require the signatures of both birth parents, both adoptive parents,
and the adult adoptee. Deloney, supra note 7, at 137. Many mutual consent registries are passive, meaning
that the state agency will not track down a party to the adoption once the other party has registered. Cahn
& Singer, supra note 15, at 163; Deloney, supra note 7, at 137. As such, parties may not know that the
registry exists and that they have an opportunity to give their consent for the release of information. Cahn
& Singer, supra note 15, at 163. Some registries are active, and an agency can seek out the other party
and inform them that a party to the adoption has registered. Deloney, supra note 7, at 137. Mutual consent
registries operate at the interstate level; there is no national registry currently in operation. There is very
little intrastate communication, if any, and adoptees must register in the state where they were born and/or
adopted. This means that an adoptee must first know where she was born and/or adopted before she can
begin the registration process at all. Further, the registration form may require information unavailable
to the applicant and the applicant may be required to undergo counseling. Registries are poorly
advertised, and it is common for parties to remain unaware that the registry system exists. Cahn & Singer,
supra note 15, at 163-64; Deloney, supra note 7, at 138.
s Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 523.
31 Christopher G.A. Loriot, Note, Good Cause Is Bad News: How the Good Cause Standard for
Records Access Impacts Adult Adoptees Seeking Personal Information and a Proposal for Reform, II U.
MASS. L. REV. 100, 108 (2016). The Uniform Adoption Act (UAA), drafted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1994, set out to standardize state, federal, and international
adoption laws and regulations. The Act supports the sealing of adoption records for a period of 99 years,
and permits the release of identifying information through either a mutual consent registry or by a court
order based on serious medical necessity. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT §§ 6-102(d), 6-103(d)-(e) (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 1994); Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 524; Loriot, supra, at 108. Notwithstanding the UAA, state
adoption laws continue to vary.
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provisions allowing adoptees of a certain age 37 to access their sealed
adoption records, and these states utilize various approaches by which access
may be granted."
A small number of states grant adult adoptees nearly39 unfettered access
to their adoption records and/or original birth certificates.4 0 Impediments to
otherwise unfettered access include a birth parent filing a denial of consent,
a contact veto, 4 1 or a request for nondisclosure. 4 2
Many states employ a "good cause" or comparable standard, whereby
adult adoptees can seek access to their adoption records through the courts
37 States vary with regard to the age at which adult adoptees are permitted access to sealed records.
Compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (West 2017) (permitting access at the age of twenty-one), with
ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-31(g) (2017) (granting access to nonidentifying information when the adoptee
turns nineteen).
3 Loriot, supra note 36, at 109. In addition to mutual consent registries, some states have enacted
search and consent mechanisms that require the state to actively search for either the biological parent or
the adoptee once one or the other has made the request for identifying information. Cahn & Singer, supra
note 15, at 165. If consent is either denied or the party cannot be found, the adoptee can seek access to
the information through the courts under a good cause standard. Id. As with mutual consent registries,
the party seeking information is at the behest of a system over which he or she has very little control. It
can be expensive and time-consuming for the intermediary to search for a biological parent. Id. Also, the
mechanism provides that contact be made only once. Therefore, an adoptee will not be notified if a
biological parent desires contact after having initially declined contact. Id. at 166. Some programs restrict
access until certain conditions are met, such as requiring a waiting period during which the applicant has
been registered on a mutual consent registry before the state can actively search for the other party. Id.
In addition to the mechanisms already described, many states permit adult adoptees access to their sealed
records through the court system upon a showing of "good cause" or "compelling need," though neither
standard is defined within any statute. Loriot, supra note 36, at 111.
" Administrative burdens still exist, such as fees and the submission of written requests. Loriot,
supra note 36, at I10. Tennessee, which grants access after the age of twenty-one, also offers a contact
veto registry for birth parents who do not wish to be contacted under any circumstances. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-1-129 (West 1996). Further, violation of the contact veto is a Class A misdemeanor. Id § 36-
1-132(f). The adoptee must also wait until the designated age at which she is permitted to request access.
See id. § 36-1-129.
4 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.500 (2016) (granting access to the original birth certificate when
an adoptee turns eighteen); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423(a) (2003) (granting access to an adoptee "of
legal age"); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.319(4)(b) (2015) (granting access at the age of eighteen); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-15 (1986) (granting access at the age of "maturity"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
127 (West 1996) (granting unrestricted access at the age of twenty-one).
' For example, in Tennessee, a contact veto may be filed by a biological parent requesting that he
or she not be contacted by the adoptee under any circumstances. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-129. This
request is recorded in the state contact veto registry. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-128(a). If a contact veto
has been filed, the adoptee is not permitted to contact that person. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-132(a). If a
contact veto has not been filed, the state will conduct a search for the biological parent in order to notify
her that she has a right to file a contact veto ifshe wishes. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-131. The birth parent
then has ninety days to file a contact veto. TENN. CODE ANN. §§§ 36-1-131 (b)(2)(B). Ifno veto has been
filed within that time, the adoptee may contact the birth parent. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-131(b)(2)(B).
Violation of the contact veto is a punishable offense. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-132; see also Carol
Chumney, Tennessee's New Adoption Contact Veto Is Cold Comfort to Birth Parents, 27 U. MEM. L.
REV. 843, 849-50 (1997).
42 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.89(b) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.345 (2016); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 6-105(b)(2) (2017).
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and will be granted access only upon a showing that the standard has been
met.43 "Good cause" and comparable standards have not been defined within
the respective statutes." Courts have found good cause in severe
psychological problems caused by the absence of information,45 in
determining an adoptee's inheritance rights,46 in a particularly significant
and overwhelming psychological need to know,4 7 as well as in a sense of
obligation to one's ancestral religion." The array of interpretations across
jurisdictions offers little guidance to judges tasked with identifying the
presence of good cause.
States offering unfettered or nearly unfettered access to adoption records
are in the minority. Moreover, these states do not permit adoptees to access
vital information regarding their biological origins until the adoptee has
reached a certain age, thus forcing the adoptee to wait for what could be
many years beyond the time at which the adoptee first developed a strong
desire to access his or her adoption records. The vast majority of states
permit access to adoption records exclusively by court order upon a showing
of good cause, a standard that lacks precision and predictability. Thus,
adoptees must first navigate the court system and file a petition for access to
information about their natural origins, and then they must wait for a court
to decide their fate based on undefined standards.
States are slowly coming to understand the importance of permitting
access to adoption records, and progress, though painstaking, is on the
horizon.49 As the leader of the New Jersey Coalition for Adoption Reform
has said, "If you're adopted it's just a natural thing to want to know where
you came from."o
III. ADOPTIVE AND BIOLOGICAL PARENT INTERESTS
Adoptive and biological parents have a variety of interests in the open
records debate. Some interests are constitutionally recognized. Most
interests, however, are purely emotional.
43 See, e.g., ARtZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-120(B) (2015) (employing a "legitimate interest" standard);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23(a) (2016) (employing the "good cause" standard); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210,
§ 5C (2017) (employing the "good cause" standard); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-780(B) (2016) (employing
the "good cause" standard).
*Loriot, supra note 36, at 111-12, 114.
* In re Assalone, 512 A.2d 1383, 1387-88 (R.I. 1986).
*Massey v. Parker, 369 So. 2d 1310, 1314 (La. 1979).
1 In re Dodge Estate, 413 N.W.2d 449, 454 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
" In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Mo. 1978).
49 The New Jersey Coalition for Adoption Reform recently won the battle to open records in the
State of New Jersey. While the new law was approved in 2014, many birth parents remain uninformed
of the development. At least eight hundred adoptees have since requested their records. Shift in Law Will
AllowAdopted Children in New Jersey To Learn Names ofBirth Parents, CBS N.Y. (Dec. 28,2016,6:12
PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2016/12/28/new-jersey-adoption/ [https://perma.cc/UM7L-W6F2].
50 Id.
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A. Adoptive Parents
Adoptive parents enjoy constitutionally protected familial privacy rights
to establish a home and direct the upbringing and education of their children
without unjustified governmental intrusion." The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that adoptive parents' privacy rights
thus encompassed the permanent preservation of sealed adoption records,
lest their disclosure disrupt the adoptive family unit.52
The Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts,53 however, intimated
that parental privacy rights were not intended to survive once the child
reached the age of adulthood.54 Parents therefore do not have a legal right to
control the decisions made by their adult children." Although open adoption
records laws which permit unsealing to occur once the child has reached the
age of majority do not impinge upon adoptive parents' constitutional rights,
adoptive parents are perhaps most threatened by open records statutes for
emotional reasons, such as fear of losing the adopted child to his or her
biological parents.5 6
There are a variety of reasons why adoptive parents may be opposed to
open records statutes. For example, adoptive parents may have initially
based their decision to adopt on the promise of permanent confidentiality.5 7
Adoptive parents who could not produce biological offspring may be
especially opposed to open records laws if their wish was to pass the adopted
child off as a birth child." Moreover, adoptive parents often view the child's
interest in his or her birth parents as a rejection or a failure." Although
adoption records contain documents which surely severed the legal
relationship between birth parents and child, it is "wishful thinking" and "a
denial of reality" to believe that the emotional, psychological, and spiritual
si See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (recognizing parents' constitutional right
to direct the upbringing of their children); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the same); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923)
(recognizing the same).
52 ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1232 (2d Cir. 1979).
1 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
14 Id. at 168-69 (noting that "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader than over
like action of adults" and that "[w]hat may be wholly permissible for adults ... may not be so for
children").
" Id.; Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 533.
5 6 See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 73 (indicating that adoptive parents feel threatened by open
records laws because they fear losing their adoptive child to the birth parents); NANCY NEWTON
VERRIER, THE PRIMAL WOUND: UNDERSTANDING THE ADOPTED CHILD 160 (1993) (indicating same
and highlighting the agony felt by adoptive mothers vis a vis the adopted child's yearning for the birth
mother); Racine, supra note 18, at 1452 (indicating same).
* Racine, supra note 18, at 1452.
ss See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 74 (describing the "feelings of shame, guilt, and anguish"
experienced by couples upon discovery of their infertility).
" Id. at 73.
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ties between them were severed as well.60
Happily, there is evidence that a significant portion of adoptive parents
favor open adoption records laws.6 1 Indeed, the bond between family
members in an adoptive family unit is such that it can withstand the
introduction of original records and a possible reunion. 62 Within this context,
any chasm that may exist between adoptive parents and the adopted child-
often a product of the conflict over open records-can be mended by open
communication and realistic expectations about all adoption-related
matters.6 ' With the best interests of the adoptee as motive for an open,
compassionate reunion of triad members,' the adoptee may have an
opportunity to heal.6 ' Adoptive parents can benefit greatly from reunion as
well because supporting the adoptee in the endeavor to access his or her
records can strengthen relationships within the adoptive family unit.66
Adoptive parents must put aside their trepidations and focus their efforts
on helping the adoptee to become whole.67 While some potential adoptive
parents may be deterred by the thought of their child reuniting with the birth
family, evidence suggests that open records laws have not adversely affected
adoption rates.6 1 Potential adoptive parents who fear open records laws
should be encouraged to undergo counseling prior to adoption. If they
remain resistant to open records, they may not be fit to adopt at all. 69
B. Biological Parents
The central issue cited by birth parents in the open adoption records
debate is their right to privacy and anonymity.70 A substantial reason for
6o VERRIER, supra note 56, at 163.
61 See Racine, supra note 18, at 1452-53 (describing a Cornell University study that found that 84%
of the adoptive mothers surveyed felt that their adopted children should have the right to obtain their
adoption records).
62 Id. at 1453.
63 See VERRIER, supra note 56, at 160-61 (describing how a poor relationship between adoptee and
adoptive parents can be exacerbated by the adoptee's desire to search for birth parents, and how the
adoptive mother must be permitted to express her fears); see also Lynn Von Korff & Harold D.
Grovenant, Contact in Adoption and Adoptive Identity Formation: The Mediating Role of Family
Conversation, 25 J. Fam. Psychol. 393, 395 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3465677/ [https://perma.cc/FP4W-EGM7]) (describing study indicating that adoptive
mothers found facilitating conversation about adoption with their adopted children benefitted the
children's "adoptive identity formation").
' That is, the adoptee, the adoptive parents, and the biological parents.
65 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 166.
66 Id. at 151-52; SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 192.
67 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 152.
6' Racine, supra note 18, at 1454.
6' Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 536.
o See Doe v. Sundquist, 943 F. Supp. 886, 888 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), affid, 106 F.3d 702 (6th Cir.
1997) (challenging the constitutionality of an open records statute on privacy grounds in an action
brought by birth and adoptive parents).
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sealing records is to afford the birth parent an opportunity to start anew, 71
and many birth parents relied on the guarantee of anonymity in making their
choice to relinquish the child. Despite the compelling privacy concerns that
some birth parents harbor, courts have found that Fourteenth Amendment
familial and reproductive privacy rights do not extend to the disclosure of
personal information.72 Notwithstanding privacy concerns, many birth
parents favor open-records statutes that afford them the chance to make
contact with relinquished children. 73 In fact, statistics indicate that the
majority of birth parents would welcome a reunion with the child they gave
up for adoption and an opportunity to learn who the child has grown up to
become.74 A birth parent's interest in anonymity lessens as the adopted child
matures, 75 since the birth parent will likely have a number of years to prepare
for possible contact and can plan accordingly.76
It is unrealistic to expect permanent confidentiality when others'
interests are involved. 77 Further, birth parents who desire permanent
confidentiality are in the minority.7 8 One suggestion is that birth parents who
wish to avoid contact with their relinquished children can do so outside of
the legal system just as they would any other person with whom they do not
want contact. 79 Another suggestion is that a birth parent who objects to
contact can request a confidential hearing before the release of information
and would then bear the burden of showing "good cause" for why
identifying information should remain sealed.o This procedure may be
beneficial to birth mothers in cases where the child was conceived from rape
or incest."1 In any event, openness is the ideal default.8 2 Moreover, evidence
suggests that making contact yields positive results." Adoption, as an
71 Rosemary Cabellero, Open Records Adoption: Finding the Missing Piece, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 291,
297 (2006); Racine, supra note 18, at 1447.
72 Sundquist, 943 F. Supp. at 893; Does v. State, 993 P.2d 822, 835-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1999); see
infra text accompanying notes 157-61.
" Cabellero, supra note 71, at 297-98; Deloney, supra note 7, at 135.
7 Deloney, supra note 7, at 135-36; Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 529.
7s Cabellero, supra note 71, at 298.
76 Racine, supra note 18, at 1450.
" Cabellero, supra note 71, at 298; see Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 533 (noting that total
confidentiality was never guaranteed to birth parents).
7 Deloney, supra note 7, at 136.
7 Deloney submits that birth parents who do not wish for contact from their biological children are
in the minority, and that maintaining sealed records would therefore not reflect the desire of the vast
majority. Id. This being the case, blanket protections for all birth parents would serve as an obstacle to
most. Those in the minority might fairly be expected, then, to handle the situation as they would any
other complicated personal endeavor (i.e., behind closed doors).
"o Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 193.
81 Id
82 Id
83 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 166; Deloney, supra note 7, at 135.
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institution, continues to thrive in the face of open records statutes,84
suggesting that open records laws are not deterrents to engaging in the
adoption process.
IV. ADOPTEE INTERESTS
A. Wounded from Birth: In the Interest of Sel/hood
Postnatal separation from the biological mother imprints upon the minds
of many relinquished children feelings of deep grief, mistrust, rejection,
shame, loneliness, and guilt." Also present may be a sense of not belonging
to one's family or to the greater society, as well as an absence of personal
identity." During the nine months a child spends in utero, he or she lives in
a state of biological, genetic, historic, psychological, emotional, and spiritual
unity with his or her biological mother.87 It is then no wonder that a child
can experience relinquishment from the arms of the biological mother as a
primal trauma and that, throughout the life of the adoptee, this pivotal
experience can manifest in myriad ways.88
Clinical psychologist and adoption researcher Nancy Newton Verrier,
herself an adoptive mother, contends that, though an infant may be
physically separate from the mother, the infant's "core-being," or "Self," is
not yet emerged from the maternal "matrix."" At this early stage, the
infant's sense of Self is wholly contained within the birthmother.90 Verrier
further contends that the infant's budding identity requires time within that
matrix during which he or she will undergo a slowly unfolding
developmental process toward a sense of self-contained wholeness.91 For
many adoptees, wholeness does not happen.92 Adoptees have reported that
their premature departure from the maternal matrix has resulted in a loss of
8 See Racine, supra note 18, at 1454 (describing statistical evidence suggesting that states with
open adoption records laws have lower abortion rates and have not experienced a decrease in adoption
rates as a result of open records laws).
" VERRIER, supra note 56, at 7; Racine, supra note 18, at 1443.
16 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 10-11, 100-03.
7Id at 10.
88 See id at 21 ("[T]he severing of that connection between the adopted child and his birthmother
causes a primal or narcissistic wound, which affects the adoptee's sense of Self and often manifests in a
sense of loss, basic mistrust, anxiety and depression, emotional and/or behavioral problems, and
difficulties in relationships .....
9 Id. at 28-30.
o Id. at 29.
9 Id.
92 See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 135-36 (describing how an adoptee's life is like a jig-saw
puzzle with missing pieces and how, despite an intense longing for wholeness, the void prevents
wholeness from coming to fruition).
12832017] IDENTITY AND PERSONHOOD
Self.93 For this reason, the search for the birthmother is a search for identity
and wholeness of Self.94
Research strongly suggests that lack of personal history is a complex
handicap for many adoptees.9 ' Adoptees are effectively denied the birthright
to know their genetic selves.96 Nationality, ancestry, and genealogy are
elements of identity that, for the adoptee, are replaced by a void.9 7 The
absence of biological heritage can result in an absence of complete
identity;98 adoptees' questions pertaining to everything from eye and hair
color to nationality and medical concerns are met with constructive silence. 99
An adoptee is unable to tap into the past when planning for the ffiture. "
Many adoptees seek information about their biological origins in order to
fill the void in their identities.'o' Healthy identity formation is crucial to the
development of self-esteem.1 02 It is perfectly natural and appropriate for an
individual to desire information about his or her ancestry and biological
heritage in order to enrich one's sense of self and placement in the bigger
picture, and to develop a notion of generational congruence and
connectedness.os
The denial of this essential information-and the lack of control over
access to the same-can be enraging for adoptees, who may manifest this
anger as embarrassment, low self-esteem, feelings of hopelessness and
helplessness, and feelings of worthlessness.'" Moreover, the denial of
access to information about one's own biological identity and heritage,
9 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 32; see Shara De Lorme, Comment, Accessing Sealed Adoption
Records: Considering Adoptees' Needs and Judicial Integrity, 28 GONZ. L. REV. 103, 105 (1992)
("Taking the child from one set ofparents and placing that child in another home with a new set of parents
dismupts a 'basic natural process."').
94 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 33; see Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 528 ("Adult adoptees who seek
access to their adoption records do so because they need these pieces to fill a void, a gap in their
identities."); Susan Whittaker Hughes, Note, The Only Americans Legally Prohibited From Knowing
Who Their Birth Parents Are: A Rejection of Privacy Rights as a Bar to Adult Adoptees' Access to
Original Birth and Adoption Records, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 429, 434-35 (2007) (stating that adult
adoptees seek access to their adoption records in order to gain an "understanding of their own personal
identities and existence"); see also De Lorme, supra note 93, at 105-06 (positing that wholeness of
identity includes the adoptee's biological and historical past, and that the need to acquire such
information is both powerful and primal).
9 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 100.
9 See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 132-33 (illustrating the experiences of adoptees who long
to know the details of their genetic makeup, nationality, and ancestry).
9 7Id. at 131-34.
9 Id. at 131.
9 Id. at 130-34.
1 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 100.
.o. Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 528.
o2 Deloney, supra note 7, at 133.
1o3 See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 (quoting psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton).
" Id. at 121, 130.
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especially as an adult, can be profoundly humiliating and dehumanizing.' 05
This identity gap can leave an adoptee feeling "anonymous," "unattached,"
or distanced from others, and "always out of context."l 06 For many adoptees,
this basic need to know is driven by feelings of "profound psychological
isolation" that stem from being unrelated to any other person in one's life.107
This sense of being untethered to one's ancestry can lead adoptees to
struggle with feelings of purposelessness, chaos, and deep insecurity,'
which can affect job and relationship prospects. 0"
Adult adoptees have formed advocacy groups that aim to challenge
sealed adoption records laws and assert adoptees' constitutional right to
identifying information about their origins."'0 Although adoptees' federal
claims have been largely unsuccessful in court, advocacy groups have been
instrumental in bringing about change on the legislative level.' Advocacy
groups have driven a major shift in the cultural perception of adoption and
the right to know one's most fundamental identity.l2 Groups contest the
"hidden legacy of shame [and] fear" associated with adoption,"' while
scholars and researchers echo and reinforce that and related sentiments.' 14
105 See id. at 122 (describing an incident where an adoption agency told a forty-year-old adoptee
that in order to receive information about her own background she would first have to obtain permission
from her seventy-six-year-old adoptive mother).
..o Id. at 138-39; see VERRIER, supra note 56, at 102 ("The loss of the thread of family continuity,
a deep identification with his ancestors whose genes are stamped into every cell of his body, contributes
to the sense of insecurity felt by the adoptee.").
1o7 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 139; Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 528.
'0 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 102-03.
`o9 See id. at 85-88 (discussing adoptees' tendency to solicit rejection as a testing behavior,
adoptees' fear of rejection and fear of success in the workplace, and the relationship between trust,
intimacy, abandonment, and rejection).
110 For example, the Adoptees Liberty Movement Association (ALMA) is a nonprofit corporation
funded wholly by registration fees and donations, and is "the pioneer organization in fighting for the
rights of adoptees everywhere." The Adoptees Liberty Movement Association Society, FAMILIES,
https://www.families.com/blog/the-adoptees-liberty-movement-association-society [https://perma.cc/
EF8W-ABTH] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016); see About, ALMA SOCIETY, http://almasociety.org/about/
[https://perma.cc/9HPN-MGW8] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) ("We are the oldest, most comprehensive
and successful registry of its kind. We have been helping our members connect with their birth relatives
since 1971."); see also Our Mission, BASTARD NATION, http://bastards.org/ [https://perma.cc/TE48-
55SH] (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) (adoptee rights organization advocating for "[t]he right to know one's
identity").
I Cabellero, supra note 71, at 305; Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 162; Hildebrand, supra note
1, at 523.
112 See, e.g., BASTARD NATION, supra note I 10.
113 d
114 See, e.g., SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 (highlighting the importance of discovering
one's biological heritage); VERRIER, supra note 56, at 102-03 (highlighting same); Cahn & Singer, supra
note 15, at 172-73 (emphasizing the critical importance of information contained in adoption records to
the formation of an adoptee's sense of identity).
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B. Federal Claims Brought by Adult Adoptees
Adult adoptees have brought claims in federal court urging the unsealing
of their adoption records on multiple constitutional grounds."' Yesterday's
Children, an adoptee-advocacy group, brought the first class-action suit of
this kind." 6 The group claimed that the state's withholding of information
pertaining to natural parents' identities was an equal protection violation
based on Plaintiffs' classification as adopted persons who, because they
were the subject of discrimination, should receive closer scrutiny by courts
when alleging an equal protection claim." 7 Adoptees then claimed that the
right to acquire this information emanated from various constitutional
penumbras"' and that the denial of access also violated their Thirteenth
Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude.' 19 Plaintiffs claimed
that they had been assigned "chattel status" as infants, which the state had
then maintained. 2 0 Although the Seventh Circuit declined to reach the
merits of Plaintiffs' claims,'121 other adoptee-advocacy groups soon brought
equivalent claims.1 22
In ALMA Society, Inc. v. Mellon,123 adult adoptees bringing Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendment claims alleged psychological pain and
suffering, concern over possible undiagnosed medical issues and related
problems, fear of accidental incest, and even crises of religious identity as a
result of lacking unencumbered access to their adoption records.1 24 The
ALMA Society adoptees argued that access to their adoption records was a
matter of their right to "personhood," that their personal identities had been
injured without their consent, and that they suffered a state-imposed
"lifelong familial amnesia," all of which constituted an infringement on their
substantive due process rights.2 5 The adoptees urged that they had a
"' See, e.g., ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1227-29 (2d Cir. 1979) (claim brought
by adult adoptees arguing that New York adoption statutes requiring the sealing of records are invalid on
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds); see, e.g., Yesterday's Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d
431, 432 (7th Cir. 1977) (claim brought by adoptee activist group contending that statutes preventing
adoptees from accessing birthparents' identities violated adoptees' First, Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights); Schechter v. Boren, 535 F. Supp. 1, 2 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (class-action
suit arguing that Oklahoma adoption statutes violate adult adoptees' First, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights).
"1 Racine, supra note 18, at 1444.
in Yesterday's Children, 569 F.2d at 432.
"1d. at 432-33.
'
19 Id. at 433.
120 Id
121 See id at 433-36 ("Our affirmation is based solely on abstention.").
122 ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1230 (2d Cir. 1979). As Yesterday's Children
brought the first, the ALMA Society brought the second ever class action suit challenging sealed adoption
records statutes. Racine, supra note 1, at 1444.
123 601 F.2d 1225, 1230 (2d Cir. 1979).
124 Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1229.
125 Id. at 1231.
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fundamental right, independent from other parties in the adoption triad, to
obtain information about their identities. 12 6
The ALMA Society adoptees also brought an equal protection claim,
alleging that adoptees constitute a quasi-suspect class whose treatment by
the state is similar to, and worse than, that of those classified as
illegitimates. 27 The adoptees argued that those classified according to
illegitimacy, unlike adoptees, tended to know whom their biological mothers
were, or, at least, had unimpeded access to this information.1 28 Adoptees
argued that they should be granted the same access to genealogical
information as their nonadopted counterparts and urged that adopted status
should compel at least intermediate scrutiny, if not strict.1 29 Adoptees also
cited state-imposed badges or incidents of slavery within the group of
adopted persons as an additional factor weighing in favor of adopted status
as a suspect category.1 3 0
The ALMA Society adoptees also brought a Thirteenth Amendment
claim, alleging that the framers of the constitution intended to abolish not
only slavery and involuntary servitude but "badges and incidents" of slavery
as well.' 3' The adoptees related their situation to the selling off of slave
children in the antebellum South and to slave states' perpetual severing of
the parent-child relationship through slavery. 3 2 The adoptees argued that
children removed from their parents and sold off to a bidder bore badges or
incidents of slavery as a result, and that their involuntary removal from birth
parents, as well as the state's perpetual denial of information about their
natural origins, echo such badges or incidents.' 33
The Second Circuit found that the New York adoption statutes
necessarily took the adoptive and biological parents' rights into account, and
that, in providing for access to records upon a showing of "good cause," they
did not infringe upon adult adoptees' identity, privacy, and personhood
rights.' 34 In so finding, the court pointed to the constitutionally recognized
right of a parent to raise a child as the parent sees fit and the constitutionally
protected sphere of the family unit."' The Second Circuit also noted that
12 6 Id. at 1230-31.
12 7 Id at 1233.
128 id
129 
d
130 Id. 1233-34.
11 Id at 1236-37.
132 Id at 1237.
133 The ALMA Society adoptees clearly use the term "badges or incidents" to mean "symptoms,"
"manifestations," "burdens," or "disabilities." Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) ("[The Thirteenth Amendment] not only struck down the institution of slavery as
previously existing in the United States, but it prevents the imposition of any burdens or disabilities that
constitute badges of slavery or servitude.").
134 Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1233.
135 Id. at 1232; see supra Section IV.D.
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protecting the privacy rights of biological parents weighed heavily in favor
of sealed records;136 the court went so far as to label the privacy rights of
natural parents as being "intrinsic human rights" that justify confidentiality
of adoption records regardless of an adoptee's age. 137
The Second Circuit also rejected the adoptees' equal protection
claims."' The court reasoned that adopted persons do not experience the
same level of intense and persistent social stigma and legal disadvantages
that illegitimates endure, 139 though the court failed to include support for this
proposition. The court swiftly rejected the adoptees' argument for suspect-
class status on the basis of state-imposed badges or incidents of slavery.'""
Finally, the Second Circuit noted that the New York statutes would
nonetheless survive intermediate scrutiny because they promoted the social
policy of encouraging and facilitating the adoption process, while protecting
the privacy interests of the biological parents, and were therefore
"substantially related to an important state interest."1 41
The Second Circuit also flatly rejected the adoptees' badges or incidents
of slavery argument and instead championed the traditionally narrow
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment to include only the conditions
of slavery and involuntary servitude.1 42 The court left "[a]bolition of the
badges and incidents [of slavery] ... to Congress." 43
A subsequent class-action lawsuit brought on behalf of adult adoptees
echoed the claims made in ALMA Society.'" In Schechter v. Boren,145 the
Oklahoma statutes that Plaintiffs challenged kept records sealed unless an
adult adoptee could show "good cause" to have them opened.146 Like the
ALMA Society court, the district court found that the adoption statutes served
a compelling state interest and promoted social policy. 147 In short, the Boren
court concluded that the rights and interests of the biological and adoptive
families were properly considered in the Oklahoma adoption records laws,
and that "good cause" was good enough for the adoptee.148
"' Mellon, 601 F.2d at 1236.
137 Id. (citation omitted).
"I Id. at 1234.
'4 Id.
141 Id. at 1234-36.
142 Id. at 1237.
143 Id,
'4 Schechter v. Boren, 535 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Okla. 1980) ("All arguments made herein by the
Plaintiff were made in the recent case ofAlma Soc. Inc. v. Mellon . .
145 id
6 Id.
'47 Id. at 3-4.
` Id. at 3, 5.
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C. Adoption and Due Process Liberty Interests
The Supreme Court has recognized liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendment that are housed within penumbras which emanate from rights
prescribed by the Constitution. 4 9 Included within the constitutional
penumbras is the right to make "personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education."o Thus, the individual has a constitutionally protected right to
make decisions, free from governmental intrusion, regarding matters which
fundamentally affect him or her."' The Supreme Court has characterized
these choices as among "the most intimate and personal" that an individual
may make, and which are "central to personal dignity and autonomy."'5 2 The
Court acknowledged that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment denotes
"the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."l53 The Court has also indicated
that, in defining one's own concept of existence and personal identity,
individuals must be shielded from state intrusion into the cultivation of
personal relationships.15 4 Additionally, the Court has viewed the right to
define one's own identity as being "central to any concept of liberty.""' As
these substantive liberty interests generally pertain to decisions that affect
the most personal and private aspects of an individual's life, the
constitutionally protected penumbras create "zones of privacy." 5 6
The Supreme Court has not yet considered the issue of adoption and
whether the privacy, identity, and liberty interests of the adoptee fall within
a constitutional penumbra. The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee considered a related issue in Doe v. Sundquist.'57 The
court found that: (1) the disclosure of information should be considered in
terms of release of information rather than familial privacy because
disclosure does not encroach upon either the adoptive or birth parents' right
to marry, to bear children, or to raise those children as they see fit, and there
is no constitutionally protected right to the nondisclosure of personal
14 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484, 486 (1965) (finding a fundamental right of privacy
in the marriage relationship to fall within the penumbra emanating from the Due Process Clause).
"s Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232-33 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923).
... Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
152 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
153 Id; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (echoing Casey within the context of
consensual homosexual sex).
154 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
155 Id
16 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
157 943 F. Supp. 886, 893 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), af'd, 106 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 1997) (action brought
by adoptive and biological parents challenging the constitutionality of an Act that allows adult adoptees
to access their sealed adoption records).
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information with regard to parties' competing privacy interests;' (2) an
open adoption records statute does not prohibit adoption and is therefore not
a restraint on constitutionally protected decision-making privacy interests; 5 9
and (3) there exists medical and psychological expertise which suggests that
adult adoptees' psychological challenges can be mitigated through access to
their adoption records.1 60 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit agreed.16 '
Professors Naomi Cahn and Jana Singer echo the District Court in
Sundquist and argue that the Constitution does not proscribe states from
opening adoption records.1 62 Cahn and Singer maintain that protected zones
of liberty and privacy should be reinterpreted to include "the development
of identity and personhood," which the currently recognized privacy
interests make possible.1 63 Access to vital information about one's biological
heritage may be critical to the discovery and construction of one's personal
identity." Therefore, in barring access to adoption records under this robust
interpretation of protected liberty interests, the state is interfering with
adoptees' personal identity construction processes and private decisional
autonomy.6 s The information contained within sealed adoption records is of
a nature equally personal, private, and crucial as any currently protected
liberty interest which promises decisional, individual, and familial
autonomy free from interference by the state.
Though an expansion of constitutionally recognized liberty interests is
likely far off, states should also open adoption records on public policy
grounds. 66 Public policy considerations may include a substantial concern
over the detrimental effects that perpetually sealed records have on adoptees
as a class, as well as a nod to the current trend of increased openness. Indeed,
the desire to know one's true identity is a fundamental and unambiguous
human instinct. 167 The hopeful expectation is that such public policy
considerations will eventually nudge the Supreme Court to expand its
understanding of Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests to include those
liberty and privacy interests germane to adopted persons.
1I Id. at 893.
.. Id. at 894-95.
16o Id. at 898.
161 Sundquist, 106 F.3d at 708.
162 Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 190.
163 id
1
" See supra Section IV.A.
165 Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 191.
166 See id. at 192 (suggesting that states base open record laws upon public policy considerations
until such time as the Constitution is reinterpreted to include affirmative liberty rights).
161 See Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 528-29 (describing the desire to know one's biological heritage
as a "basic human need to know" and comparing the attachment to one's biological parents as that of the
attachment to one's gender and race); Racine, supra note 18, at 1443 (describing the need to know as a
"fundamental human desire"). For a discussion about the search for identity, see supra Section IV.A.
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D. Children as Chattel: Badges or Incidents of Slavery
Access to information about one's genetic background, heritage, and
ancestry is a birthright denied only to adoptees.1s For many adoptees, denial
of access to birth records is an objectifying experience.' 69 Essentially, the
adoptee is expected to honor a contract made over his or her body and
without his or her consent.1 70 This condition smacks of slavery. As one
adoptee put it, "[w]e damn sure have been bought and sold on the open
market." 17 1 One adoptive parent, engaged in a heated discussion with other
adoptive parents about whether their children should have access to
identifying information about their birth parents, noted that the group of
them had been speaking of their children as if they were chattel.1 72 Indeed,
children have historically been considered as property in the context of
certain constitutional privacy rights. 173 These rights concern familial privacy
and the right to control the upbringing of one's children.
The Supreme Court noted in Meyer v. Nebraska1 74 that parents have a
constitutional right to control the upbringing of their children.' 75 Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, an expert in children's constitutional and human rights,
posits that the underbelly of the Meyer doctrine is marked by the
"voicelessness" and "objectification" of children.176  The constitutional
enshrinement of the child as the private property of the parent is the footing
upon which the constitutional theory of the family has been built. 17 7 Further,
the constitutional theory of the family ultimately pertains to power relations
within the family and between the family unit and greater society.17' Thus,
the question presented in Meyer and in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
i' See ALMA Soc'y, Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1233, 1237 (2d Cir. 1979) (adoptee advocacy
group claimed that they were a suspect group because they, unlike illegitimates, did not have access to
the identities of their birth families and that this forced ignorance was similar to that of slave children in
the antebellum South who were forcibly removed from their parents and denied access to their parents'
identities or any means of communication with them). The author takes no position on whether the
offspring of egg donors are similarly denied access to information relating to genetic background,
heritage, and ancestry.
69 See SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 136 ("We adoptees are made to feel inferior, like second-
class citizens, when we are denied access to our birth records.").
170 Id
171 Id
172 Id at 118.
171 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1000-01 (1992) (shining light on the underbelly of the
constitutional right to control one's children).
1 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
' Id. at 400 (indicating a parent's right to control one's children, including control over a child's
educational endeavors); see also Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (citing Meyer and noting a parent's constitutional right to direct the upbringing of his children).
"6 Woodhouse, supra note 171, at 1001.177 Id at 997.
178 Id. at 999.
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Holy Names,1 79 and also presented in the context of adoption, concerns
ownership over the child.'o The Supreme Court indicated its position on this
question in its construction of Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests,
which includes the right of parents to control the upbringing of their
children.'
Woodhouse suggests that property and ownership rhetoric during the era
of Meyer and Pierce intimated not that children were in fact property, but
that assumptions about children and assumptions about property were
decidedly "analogous."l 82 Woodhouse further advances that children, if not
the property of their parents, were "important conduits and conservers of
parental property," and that the significance of this role ties directly to the
maintenance and preservation of patriarchal power.' From a perspective
that views the role of the child as an instrument designed to maintain the
legacy of the parent, first as a subject of the parent's direction, and second
as the inheritor of all that the parent has bestowed upon the child, one can
appreciate the stakes underlying constitutional liberty and familial privacy
rights afforded parents, and why parents might feel compelled to assert those
rights. The Meyer doctrine interests persist in the adoption records debate
even today.' 8 4
As children's rights and anti-child labor movements proliferated across
the United States in the early 1900s,'8 5 and as these movements sought to
limit parental power over the child,' their legal manifestation was the
concern over child welfare and the advent of a "best interests" standard. 187
What this suggests is that the child-once exclusively in the hands of the
father-became, also, a possession of the state. This relational power
dynamic plays out with full force in the context of adoption. The question of
ownership endures: to whom does the adoptee belong?
179 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
1so Woodhouse, supra note 171, at 999, 1036-37.
s Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
112 Woodhouse, supra note 171, at 1042.
'8 Id. at 1047.
'" See supra Section lI.A.
... See Woodhouse, supra note 171, at 1051 (describing a cultural shift toward recognition of
children's collective rights and needs as separate from the patriarchal family structure).
'. Id. at 1052.
187 See id. at 1057 (noting that judicial opinions in child custody cases centered on the issue of the
child's best interest); see also supra Section I (discussing the advent of the "best interests" standard).
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V. ADVOCATING FOR THE MINOR-ADOPTEE
A. Adolescence
Adolescence, like birth, is colored by a process of individuation from
one's parents.' 8 As such, adolescence is a time during which children search
for their own identity.' 89 Adolescent adoptees can have an especially hard
time during this period of struggle for self-discovery, as the lack of personal
history combined with an inability to identify with the adoptive family can
prove a recipe for self-destruction.' 9 0 Lacking a biological sense of self,
some adolescent adoptees turn feelings of hurt and rejection into anger
aimed at the adoptive parents.' 9 ' Some adoptees act out and leave, attempt
to leave, or are expelled from their homes prematurely, and some are sent to
adolescent treatment centers and alternative schools, which rarely address
the core abandonment and identity issues at play. 92 Some adoptees reject
the adoptive parents as a way of asserting independence from those to whom
they are not actually related.'93 Still, some intentionally become pregnant in
order to create a biological relative.' 94
While adolescence is characterized by conflict between children and
parents for the adopted and non-adopted alike, an adoptee's want for
biological, genealogical, and ancestral identity can significantly bar a sense
of inclusion within greater society.1 95 This feeling of profound alienation,
when unrecognized and unaddressed in adolescence, can spiral into
adulthood and affect the adult adoptee's spiritual, mental, and emotional
development, as well as the adoptee's ability to make career and relationship
choices.'96 Adoption expert Dr. Arthur Sorosky posits that the adolescent
adoptee's process of identity formation is complicated by having been cut
'. SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 111.
' VERRIER, supra note 56, at 100; see SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 114 (describing
adolescence as a time of pronounced concern over one's individual and genealogical identity).
'" VERRIER, supra note 56, at 100 ("Because of the dearth of information about his own history,
the adoptee often has a more stressful adolescence than his non-adopted counterpart.").
191 Id. at 100-0 1.
192 Id. at 101; SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 108, 110. The academic director of one such
alternative school in Utah recently noted that roughly one quarter of her clients are adolescent adoptees.
She noted that her adopted clients all exhibit indications of attachment disorder, meaning that they each
have difficulty forming healthy, lasting relationships, and actively pursue risky behaviors. Interview with
Anonymous (Jan. 7, 2016).
'9' VERRIER, supra note 56, at 102 ("Other adoptees leave because they no longer want to do what
these parents, to whom they are not really related, want them to do.").
194 Id.
195 Id. at 103.
' Id.; see SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 106-07, 112 (providing personal reflections of
adolescence from approximately twenty-seven adoptees who experienced various identity and insecurity
crises, and who struggled through difficult relationships with their adoptive parents during this pivotal
time, and describing the adolescent adoptee's inability to productively plan for the future due to a lack
of genealogical continuity).
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off from essential parts of him or herself that remain inaccessible, and that
this hitch in the development process often results in identity confusion.1 7
In essence, indications about one's biological identity can be indispensably
important during the adolescent search for self and quest for existential
rootedness,' 98 and this is a natural juncture at which the adoptee may wish
to embark on a search for identifying information.19 9
Adoptive parents and society alike are encouraged to recognize that it is
natural and healthy for the adoptee to want to search for his or her biological
parents, and especially the birth mother.200 Further, adoptive parents are
encouraged to set aside their own insecurities and assist their adopted child
in the search for information. 201 The more openness that exists about the
adoption experience in the adoptive household, the less likely it will be that
the adolescent adoptee resorts to excessive limit-testing behavior in an effort
to resolve the identity confusion.202 The adopted child is the only member of
the adoption triad who has had neither choice nor control over the most
fundamental aspects of his or her life.203 Having been forcibly estranged
from his or her genealogical roots, the adoptee has been manipulated since
birth. 20 This is precisely what distinguishes the adoptee from the biological
and adoptive parents. It is no wonder that many adolescent adoptees,
treading through the murky waters of adolescent identity formation, become
angry and resentful toward those who perpetuate the manipulation. One
study found that "[r]eunions often seem to have a calming effect, so that
there are no longer the urges to run away from home or engage in other self-
defeating behaviors."205 When considering the myriad ways that lacking
access to identifying information can injure and handicap the adolescent
11 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 110.
'
9 1 Id. at 113.
'" See VERRIER, supra note 56, at 122 ("The adolescent adoptee will need more information about
his biological family as it becomes ... apparent that he has no long-term history with the people with
whom he is living . .. he will begin to think about searching during this stage of development.").
200 Id. at 150; see SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 105, 106 (explaining how the adolescent
adoptee's natural curiosity about his biological heritage is often construed by adoptive parents as a
rejection of their love and parenting, which intensifies the conflict between them).
201 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 117 (stating that parents should "emotionally dissociate"
themselves and make themselves available to assist their child in obtaining his/her records and searching
for the birth parents).
202 Id. at 119.
203 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 152. Kaye Pearse, an adoptee advocate, is seeking to have her
adoption annulled, and views her adoption as a contract between her adoptive parents and the state and,
although she was the subject of the contract, she "didn't agree to anything." Pearse claims that she "had
no more say in the matter than [her] house did when [she] signed a contract to buy it." Kaye Pearse,
Adoptees Should Be Able to Annul Their Relationship with Their Adoptive Parents, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4,
2015, 7:15 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/aug/04/adoptees-annul-
relationship-adoptive-parents [https://perma.cc/E6US-7ZUP].
204 VERRIER, supra note 56, at 152.
205 Id. at 151. The same study found that reunions can help ameliorate the adoptee's relationship
with her adoptive parents.
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adoptee, it becomes clear that some adolescents may greatly benefit from
access to their adoption records at this pivotal stage.
B. Judicial Approval and the Bellotti v. Baird Parental Bypass Mechanism
The Supreme Court, in Bellotti v. Baird,206 recognized that minors'
claims against deprivations of liberty and property interests by the state
generally warrant constitutional protections equivalent to those for adults.207
At the same time, the Court recognized that states can impose restrictions on
children and adolescents' freedom to make certain important choices for
themselves, as youngsters may lack the requisite judgment, perspective, and
experience needed to assess potential consequences. 20  As a further
justification for limiting the freedom of minors, the Court cited the Nation's
history and tradition of deferring to the parental right to raise, direct, prepare,
and nurture their children as the parent sees fit.209 In so doing, the Court
referenced Pierce v. Society of Sisters ,210 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 2 1' and Prince
v. Massachusetts.2 12 Still, the Supreme Court has found that absolute
parental control over certain circumstances in the life of a minor unduly
burdens the minor's constitutionally protected rights. 2 13
In Bellotti, the Court found that the abortion decision was different from
other important decisions because of the significance and severity of
potentially detrimental effects of postponement in case the decision is made
for the minor by default. 214 The Bellotti Court, in assessing the abortion
context, concluded that a minor is entitled to make her own decision about
whether to seek an abortion, and that the minor would be unduly burdened
by the imposition of the requirement of parental notice or consent.215 The
Court outlined a procedure by which a pregnant minor may, therefore,
bypass parental consultation in seeking authorization for an abortion and go
directly to a court in the first instance to resolve the matter:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show
either: 1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed
206 443 U.S. 623 (1979).
207 Id. at 634.
20 Id. at 635.209 Id. at 637-38.
210 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (noting, in dicta, a patent's constitutional right to direct the
upbringing of his children).
" 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (holding that a parent has a right and duty to direct the upbringing of
his children).
2' Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 637-38 (citing 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
213 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (finding that an
absolute parental veto over a minor's decision to seek an abortion was an undue burden on the minor's
right to terminate her pregnancy).
214 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642-44.
2151 d at 643, 647.
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to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her
physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or 2) that
even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the
desired abortion would be in her best interests.2 16
A minor who satisfies the court that she is mature, well informed, and
capable of making the decision independently will be granted authorization
for the abortion.217 A minor may first seek approval from her parents-if she
wishes-but is entitled to seek authorization from the courts
notwithstanding parental consent, approval, or lack thereof.218 While
parental involvement is ideal, it cannot serve as an obstruction to the
realization of the minor's constitutional right.219
The right to information about one's biological heritage is as essential
as one's right to seek an abortion. As described in Part A of this Section, the
adolescent adoptee's lack of genealogical information can be a handicap
whose solution should not be postponed until the adoptee is of majority age,
lest the consequences of identity confusion irrevocably extend into
adulthood. For many, information vital to one's biological identity is as
critical to engineering one's destiny and planning for one's future as the
time-sensitive family-planning process of seeking an abortion, and the
Bellotti approval mechanism should be made available for minor adoptees
seeking their adoption records. This way, a minor adoptee can gain access
to his or her birth records in either of two ways: (1) the minor adoptee can
obtain approval from his or her adoptive parents; or (2) the minor adoptee
can bypass parental notification in cases where the adoptee believes it would
be counterproductive or harmful, and can go directly to the court for
authorization. 2 20 When the adolescent seeks judicial approval, he or she must
make a showing that he or she is "mature enough and well enough informed"
to make the decision to obtain his or her adoption records, or that receiving
the information would be in his or her best interest regardless of his or her
ability to make the decision independently.22 1
As inBellotti, the deciding judge may find that the minor's best interests
would be served by parental consultation and can defer decision until such
time as the court may participate in the same.222 Openness within the
adoptive family leads to better outcomes, 2 23 and the court may find that a
216 Id. at 643-44.
217 Id. at 650.
21 1 Id. at 647.
219 Id. at 647-48.
220 See id. at 643-44 (describing the approval mechanism in the context of abortion).
221 Id. at 643-44.
222 1d at648.
223 SOROSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 119; VERRIER, supra note 56, at 151-52 ("Whatever helps the
adoptee will help the relationship with the adoptive parents... . Searching for the birthmother is in the
best interest of the adoptee.").
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family can therapeutically benefit from such openness. At the same time, a
court may find that openness will not work in certain families,224 in which
case an adoptee must be given the opportunity to show the court that he or
she bears the requisite level of maturity and awareness to receive the
information sought.2 5 Demanding that an adoptee wait until a certain age 226
to begin the process of seeking access to his or her adoption records is an
arbitrary intrusion upon the developmental process of a budding young
adult.227 While most scholarship arguing for open adoption records statutes
focuses exclusively on the rights of the adult adoptee,22 8 scholars ignore a
key developmental stage in the life of an adoptee where access to
information about one's personal history could be instrumental in shaping
healthy, well-adjusted members of society. 22 9 While this is not the answer
for every single adolescent adoptee, the opportunity to seek access to this
vital information must be available to all.
CONCLUSION
Accessing adoption records is critical to the deeply personal identity
formation processes of many adopted persons. The compelling emotional,
psychological, and constitutional interests of adoptees necessitate the
immediate abolishment of state laws that impede unfettered access to
adoption records. This Note has illuminated the emotional and psychological
effect that lacking key information about one's biological heritage tends to
have on adolescent and adult adoptees. In so doing, this Note examined
identity and selfhood issues germane to the adolescent and adult adoptee,
and federal claims brought by open records advocacy groups. This Note
strongly suggested the expansion of constitutional liberty interests to include
the autonomous development of personal identity, and this Note discussed
the objectification of adopted persons through an analysis of adopted
children as chattel. Finally, this Note suggested a procedure whereby eligible
adoptees below the age of majority may gain access to their adoption
records.
Evidence strongly suggests that many adolescent and adult adoptees
could benefit profoundly from access to their birth records and the
background information contained therein. Any governmental, adoptive
parent, and biological parent interests in maintaining private control over
224 Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
225 See id. (permitting the same mechanism for minors seeking an abortion).
226 See supra note 40.
227 See supra Section V.A.
228 See, e.g., Cabellero, supra note 71, at 301; Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 153; De Lorme,
supra note 93, at 108; Deloney, supra note 7, at 117; Hildebrand, supra note 1, at 528, 536.
229 See Cahn & Singer, supra note 15, at 172 n.102 and accompanying text (noting that minor
adoptees may need information about their biological origins as they mature and develop a sense of
identity).
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adoptees are antiquated, objectifying, and oppressive. Adoptees have
pronounced liberty and privacy interests in identity, personhood, and
decisional autonomy, and these analogous constitutional interests echo the
deeply unjust emotional and psychological ramifications of being denied
access to information essential to the formation of one's whole and complete
Self. Without access to their records, many adoptees suffer from feelings of
alienation and deficiency. Open records laws can help heal these wounds
where secrecy has continuously failed. It is in recognizing the primacy of
adoptees' interests that sealed records may become an embarrassment of the
past.
